Check the export yourself. Two questions, answered separately.
A Trustvice compliance export is opaque bytes with a detached signature and a Bitcoin timestamp. The signature says who issued it. The timestamp says when its digest existed. They are checked separately here, because a wrong timestamp does not make a correctly signed export false, and a good one does not rescue a broken signature.
No account. The proof is never uploaded. The only thing fetched is our published public keys, which anyone can fetch.
In this browser
Verify a proof.
The file is the one the exports page saves beside a download – trustvice-export-proof-<id>.json. The artifact itself stays where it is; this checks the proof that describes it.
The proof is read in this browser and checked here. It is not uploaded. The only request made is for our published public keys, which anyone can fetch — a verdict we produced for you would not be an independent one.
On your own machine
The same code, and the check a browser cannot make.
An export proof
npx @trustvice/verifier trustvice-export-proof-exp_abc.json --keys export-keys.jsonThe signature over the artifact's digest, plus the Merkle path from that digest into the anchored batch.
Fetch the published key set once
curl -s https://trustvice.com/api/v1/exports/keys > export-keys.jsonAnonymous, no account. Private halves never leave the Worker that serves it.
…and confirm the batch root on-chain
npx @trustvice/verifier … --btc-headers headers.jsonThe check this page cannot make: the OpenTimestamps proof bytes are not in the sidecar, so a browser can prove membership of the batch but not that the batch reached Bitcoin.
The published package is the same code this page runs – not a second implementation that could drift from it.
How the chains behind these exports are kept tamper-evident is on /security.
声明规则,让每次运行都接受检查。
智能体、证据、治理、商务和披露都在 Trustvice 360 中。免费注册,在一个仪表板中打开所有套件。